I. INTRODUCTION
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which killed almost 3,000 civilians, led to profound changes in societal viewpoints, politi cal agendas, and the legal authority to combat terrorism and threats of terrorism. The United States, like all other democratic nations that have suffered terrorist attacks, continues to struggle with questions of how to keep its population safe while maintaining the principles of democracy and the rule of law that are essential to the nation's character.
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In the twelve years since the attacks of September 11, Congress, the executive branch and the judicial system have reacted strongly to the need to protect against future national security threats by giving more powers to the police, military, and intelligence forces to investi gate potential threats and neutralize them before another attack occurs. Some of the these changes occurred in response to U.N. Secur ity Council resolutions, 1 but many have been domestically motivated shifts that reflect the will of politicians and the polity as a whole. The expanded powers accorded to these counterterrorism programs have-in the view of many critics-allowed for government infringe ment on civil liberties and human rights in significant and corrosive ways, with little or no accountability for such overreaching.
In the years immediately following the attacks of September 11, the Bush administration asserted both inherent presidential author ity and broad powers conferred under the Authorization for the Use of Military Force 2 and the USA Patriot Act. 3 The government con ducted warrantless wiretapping surveillance, detained thousands of individuals-almost all of whom were Muslim-who were later re leased based on lack of evidence of any connection to terrorism, conducted extraordinary renditions to capture and transport sus pected individuals from one country to another without judicial oversight, and resorted to torture as an interrogation and control technique on some detainees.
Some of these issues were eventually resolved-through public pressure, judicial intervention and/or a change in political branches-in ways that improved the individual rights of detainees, suspects and the public. Yet robust presidential authority and ex tremely high levels of secrecy continue to be the norm, and the nation's policymakers still struggle with how best to maintain secur ity, accountability, and the rule of law.
II. THE DEFINITION OF TERRORISM
Terrorism is defined in numerous ways under U.S. law, but con tains several basic elements: premeditation, political or religious motivation, perpetration of violence, noncombatant targets, and ac tors as subnational groups or clandestine agents. 4 The United States has not made any exceptions to this definition based on the activity being expressive in character or with regard to national liberation struggles. 5 The USA PATRIOT Act, passed in the weeks immediately follow ing the September 11 attacks, offers both greater counterterrorism resources and more flexibility in implementation to the government, including increased surveillance powers, 6 increased government au thority to conduct intelligence-gathering operations in matters of suspected terrorism, 7 the power of civil seizure of assets based only on probable cause, 8 and heightened punishments for any of the un derlying crimes related to the newly broadened understanding of "domestic terrorism," which includes:
[A]cts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State [that] ap pear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by intimi dation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 9 This definition of domestic terrorism was the result of intense pres sure on Congress 10 to amend various existing criminal statutes to [Vol. 62 broaden and strengthen the government's resources before another attack potentially took place. 11 The Patriot Act amended the definition of terrorism from 18 U.S.C. § 2331 to broaden its scope and application further, 12 but in cluded an important sunset provision-added in part because of the haste with which the legislation was passed-that forced Congress to reexamine the legislation at intervals of several years. 13 Although Congress debated the renewal of certain parts of the Patriot Act in 2005-none of which involved the definition of terrorism-in March 2006, Congress renewed most provisions, removed the safeguard of a sunset provision, and made the provisions permanent. 14 The current Patriot Act definition of terrorism has a broad scope, and its reach exacerbates the uncertainty surrounding the applica tion of conflicting definitions of terrorism, including the potential lack of notice to individuals as to whether they will be categorized as a terrorist and exactly what kind of conduct is prohibited. 15 
III. CRIMINAL LAWS AND PROSECUTIONS

A. Criminal Law
Terrorist acts are often prosecuted using the ordinary criminal justice system, particularly when the alleged crime occurred domesti cally. Statutes such as the Anti-Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) 16 terrorist acts and to enable investigation and prosecution of activities that were not previously criminalized.
A serious constitutional issue has been raised with regard to a number of U.S. statutes that criminalize speech-related conduct that supports or encourages violent acts, including terrorist acts. The fed eral criminal solicitation 17 and sedition statutes, 18 for example, authorize such prosecution. However, the most widely used statute in this area criminalizes material support of terrorism. Sections 2339A and 2339B of Title 18 of the U.S. Code prohibit knowingly or inten tionally providing, attempting to provide, or conspiring to provide material support or resources to a terrorist organization, defining the term "material support or resources" to include: any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, fi nancial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identifica tion, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials. 19 Material support charges have been used extensively to try terrorism suspects or to exert pressure toward a plea bargain, and are often successful. 20 23 the material support statute does not require the defendant to have had a specific intent to support a terrorist act; knowing support of a desig nated terrorist organization without intent is sufficient to convict. 24 The scope and flexibility offered by the material support statute has made it an often-used tool for prosecutors and was used to convict John Walker Lindh, 25 Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, 26 and the so-called "Lackawanna Six," 27 among others.
In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the statute does not unconstitutionally infringe on the expressive rights of individu als. 28 In some respects, this decision promoted additional uncertainty as to what individuals and organizations will be prosecuted under the material support statute, and on what basis. 29 The United States government maintains, however, that the majority of the terrorist propaganda found on the Internet today could not be prosecuted under U.S. criminal law, and that even a website advocating commit ting acts of terrorist violence likely lacks (at least without proof of additional facts) the potential to produce imminent lawless action that could be criminalized. 30 
B. Terrorism Prosecutions
The United States has historically shied away from specialized trials for terrorist attacks, instead relying on the criminal justice sys tem. 31 In part, this policy is intended to affirm the rule of law in the United States and to maintain the United States' reputation in the international community for fairness toward criminal defendants 32 regardless of the crime committed or the national origin or religion of the defendant. 33 One critique of the criminal justice system with regard to terror ism prosecutions has been the de facto unavailability of the entrapment defense. In evaluating an entrapment defense, most courts will consider whether the defendant was induced into illegal acts by law enforcement or had, to the contrary, a predisposition to commit the crime even if law enforcement had not intervened. In the context of a terrorism prosecution, a defendant's predisposition to ward terrorist acts is often inferred from the defendant's political and religious views, or sympathies toward those of the same political bent or religious background who have engaged in terrorist activities. 34 In the post-9/11 context, there has not been one publicly known instance of a successful entrapment defense in a terrorism case, 35 despite am ple evidence of law enforcement inducing defendants toward illegal activities. 36 Since September 2001, numerous alternative venues to criminal trials have been proposed and sometimes used. The creation of a spe cialized national security court has been advocated by some on the political left and right as a means to professionalize and depoliticize the process of adjudicating terrorism trials while also protecting the classification of secret documents. 37 [Vol. 62 been met with concern and have not been implemented. The Bush administration made a decision soon after September 2001 to use military commissions to try those who were designated by the admin istration as "enemy combatants." The military commission system has been through several iterations in the intervening twelve years, but relatively few defendants have actually been tried in this system. 38 
C. Punishment of Terrorism
Prior to the passage of the AEDPA in 1996, sentencing for crimes involving terrorism fell within the range dictated under ordinary criminal law, since defendants usually faced charges based on violent criminal activity, regardless of any political motivations. Upon the passage of the Patriot Act, Congress authorized enhancements to the sentencing for numerous terrorism-related crimes. 39 As a result, sentences for such crimes increased significantly, even in situations where there was no direct link to an act of violence, such as material support for terrorism. 40 The existence of a terrorism sentencing en hancement also serves as a statutory basis for appellate courts to overturn sentences as too lenient, as has occurred in high-profile prosecutions, such as those of Ahmad Abu Ali, Lynne Stewart, and Jose Padilla. 41 
IV. INVESTIGATIVE POWERS
A. Police Powers
The USA PATRIOT Act and other legislation in the post-9/11 context increased the powers of federal law enforcement authorities such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). This has led to increased surveillance and investigation, as well as a significant number of arrests of alleged terrorists. The government has main tained that its efforts have prevent planned terrorist acts from occurring 42 and has elicited valuable counterterrorism and intelli gence information as part of the interrogation, negotiation, and plea bargain process. 43 The federal material witness statute, which em 44 has enhanced the ability of law enforcement to detain indi viduals with potentially relevant information for terrorism prosecutions, but it has also increased the potential for abuse of dis cretion and abuse of executive power. 45 For most 46 covert counterterrorism-related surveillance, the FBI is obligated to follow requirements under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) to seek judicial approval from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). Under FISA, law enforce ment officials must meet the standard of probable cause to garner a warrant for surveillance, a standard that the government meets in almost all cases. 47 Law enforcement officers must undertake a mini mization process by which they attempt to ensure that individuals and communications that are not targets of investigation are ex cluded from surveillance. 48 Much of the information garnered pursuant to a FISC warrant is usable in court. FISA has been amended several times since its enactment in 1978, with the most recent amendments in 2008 allowing for broader surveillance author ity and immunizing telecommunications companies that work with law enforcement to enable surveillance from civil liability. 49 The FBI's police powers have also generated a high level of scru tiny of immigrant populations within the United States. The lowered due process protections accorded to immigrants allow for a more searching and a less privacy-protective approach. Lawyers cite the presence of FBI agents during immigration proceedings, Immigration and Custom Enforcement's (ICE) reliance on statements made in old FBI interviews in its decisions, and the FBI's submission of prejudi 46. National Security Letters, used over 100,000 times by the Bush administra tion, circumvented judicial oversight altogether. Instead, they were subpoenas by the FBI seeking information on a target from third parties such as banks or employers, while implementing a gag order on the recipients of the subpoenas. [Vol. 62 cial affidavits raising national security concerns without providing the basis of the allegations. FBI agents have used the structural power imbalances inherent in the immigration processes to coerce Muslim immigrants into becoming informants, or retaliate if they refuse. 50 State and local police agencies have worked on counterterrorism issues, often in conjunction with federal law enforcement agencies. Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) 51 are arrangements in which a local police department assigns a number of officers to work on a ter rorism-related task force with FBI agents; 52 federal agents offer access to powerful investigative tools, whereas police departments of fer local knowledge and engagement in community policing. 53 Over one hundred American cities participate in JTTFs, 54 despite occa sional concerns that the JTTFs engage in unconstitutional racial and religious profiling. 55 Municipalities like New York City have engaged in expansive counterterrorism work in the post-9/11 years that has raised significant concerns as the infringement of civil liberties. 56 Fu sion centers are state and local entities meant to enhance the ability of the federal government to garner and synthesize information from local communities, 57 
B. Intelligence Agencies
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA), the leading intelligence-gathering organizations for the U.S. government, have operated with much greater latitude in the post-9/11 era than previously. 59 The CIA has worked extensively to capture, detain and interrogate suspected terrorists abroad. It op erated various secret detention facilities, known as "black sites," throughout the world to accomplish this goal, prompting criticism from international and domestic groups that people were being disap peared by the CIA. 60 In 2009, the use of those black sites was curtailed by President Obama. 61 In the post-9/11 era, the NSA has, among other programs, allo cated tremendous energy and resources to massive data collection of electronic communications of U.S. and foreign persons. 62 The NSA defends its collection of telephone call metadata and electronic com munications based on the FISC's interpretation of section 215 of the Patriot Act. The FISC has created a nonpublic body of law that has allowed the NSA to amass the metadata (time, location, duration, and other information not containing content) for all domestic and some international phone calls. 63 From June 2013 onward, as details of the breadth and depth of the NSA's surveillance programs con tinue to leak to the public, 64 questions have arisen as to whether the scope of NSA's surveillance is an unconstitutional intrusion into the privacy of U.S. citizens, whether congressional oversight of the NSA [Vol. 62 must be strengthened, 65 and whether the FISC provides an effective mechanism to curb potential abuse by the NSA. 66 These debates continue to be robust, largely due to the impact of these counterterrorism programs on a vast swath of the U.S. public and because of the seeming inability of the public to understand the program and curtail it. This frustration stems from the secrecy sur rounding the program, Congress's inability to disclose the extent of its knowledge to the public or exercise substantial oversight, FISC not being able to take an adversarial position with regard to govern ment assurances of the necessity of such surveillance, and the extent of NSA access to the data stored by telecommunications companies, even without their consent. 67 In response to the public debate, task forces were convened to examine the scope and legality of the NSA's work. 68 As of early 2014, Congress and the administration continue to weigh various options for reforming both intelligence-gathering and storage policies, as well as oversight and accountability measures. 
V. PROSCRIPTION/LISTING OF TERRORIST GROUPS/INDIVIDUALS
A. Proscription Mechanisms
The ability of the Secretary of State to designate "foreign terror ist organizations" (FTOs) as such for the purposes of prohibiting material support, increasing surveillance and freezing financial as sets has been an important tool for U.S. counterterrorism efforts. 70 In particular, U.S. law provides that incitement to commit a terrorist act (under circumstances indicating an intention to cause death or serious bodily injury) is a basis for designating a group as either an FTO 71 or as a terrorist organization for immigration purposes. 72 Even if a group has not been formally designated as an FTO, if the requisite incitement standard is met, that automatically triggers treatment as a terrorist organization for immigration purposes. 73 Ob servers suggest that the FTOs fall into one of two categories: those that genuinely threaten the national security of the United States in a direct way, and those that challenge the foreign relations or eco nomic interests of the United States. 74 Under the AEDPA, a specific process must be undertaken to des ignate an organization as an FTO. 75 It is a process that is open to critique as being insufficiently rights-protective, but also incorpo rates some safeguards against abuse. 76 Once the FTO designation has been made by the State Department, limited procedural safe guards are available, after which the designation is finalized. 
B. Challenges to Proscriptions and Listings
Another such safeguard in the FTO designation process is the opportunity to contest the designation proposed by the State Depart ment. This layer of judicial review protects against arbitrariness in the designation, 83 and requires some disclosure of the basis upon which the State Department made its determination. 84 Designated groups may challenge their designations by seeking judicial review before the D.C. Circuit Court within thirty days of the designation being published in the Federal Register. The court may rely only on the administrative record generated by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of State may supplement this record on an ex parte basis with classified information used in making the designa tion. 85 The D.C. Circuit has the right to reverse if the designation is found to be not in accord with the procedures required by law. The FTO designation remains in force until it is revoked by either judicial or administrative review. In either case, the burden lies with the FTO to challenge its designation. 88 Title III of the Patriot Act amended the Bank Secrecy Act to re quire certain financial institutions and businesses to establish antimoney laundering programs . 89 The government also sought to en courage transparency, good corporate governance and strong antimoney laundering programs through suggesting that public and me dia attention will cause social stigma to attach to businesses that engage with entities that are associated with criminal or terrorist ac tivity. 90 U.S. authorities have prioritized the investigation and disruption of funding to non-profit organizations, and have used the material support statutes as an effective, if highly controversial, tool to hinder the ability of terrorist groups to maintain their finances. The robust use of material support statutes has caused such solicita tion to wither or, in some cases, go further underground. 91 The Department of Justice is the principal government entity re sponsible for overseeing the investigation and prosecution of money 86 
B. Criminal Offences of Terrorism Financing
The issues of what standards of knowledge and intent are neces sary to sustain a conviction for material support of terrorism have been extensively litigated. The 2010 Supreme Court decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project affirmed the constitutionality of the material support statute, thereby upholding the congressional in tent to criminalize almost all support to FTOs, even if the funds were earmarked for humanitarian-not terrorism-purposes. 94 The four federal offenses deal directly with financing of terrorism or terrorist organizations and criminalize the provision of material support for the commission of certain offenses, 95 provision of material support or resources to designated FTOs, 96 provision or collection of terrorist funds, 97 and the concealment or disguise of either material support to FTOs or funds used or to be used for terrorist acts. 98 
VII. IMMIGRATION MEASURES
Immigration Detention
The government is authorized to detain any person for whom it has certified that reasonable grounds exist to believe that the person has engaged in espionage, 99 opposition by violence, 100 or terrorist ac tivity, 101 99. Immigration and Naturalization Act ("INA") §237(a)(4)(A)(i) (authorizing de tention for those suspected of engaging in espionage, sabotage, or export control).
100. INA §237 (a)(4)(A)(iii) (authorizing detention for those expressing opposition by violence or overthrow of the U.S. government).
101. INA §212(a)(4)(B) (authorizing detention for those suspected of terrorist activ ity); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(III) and (iv)(I) (authorizing removal of those indicating an intention to cause death or serious bodily harm or have incited terrorist activity); 8 terrorist activity. 102 The Attorney General may detain the suspect for up to seven days prior to placing the suspect in removal proceedings or charging him or her criminally. 103 If the suspect is not placed in removal proceedings or criminally charged, the Attorney General must release him or her, but if placed in proceedings, the Attorney General must detain the person even if he or she is eligible for relief or obtains relief until the Attorney General determines that there is no longer any reason to believe that the person falls under one of the bases for certification. 104 The Attorney General is obligated to review the certification subjecting the person to mandatory detention every six months and the detainee may request review every six months and may submit documents and other evidence in support of his or her request. 105 A detainee who has been ordered removed, but whose removal is unlikely in the reasonably foreseeable future, may be de tained for additional six month periods only if the government believes that release will threaten national security or the safety of the community or any person. 106 Since September 11, 2001, the federal government has relied heavily on immigration law and policy to detain, interrogate, control and remove suspected terrorists. 107 With fewer checks and balances, it is much easier for the government to arrest, detain, and investigate an individual under immigration law than criminal law. Unlike the U.S. criminal justice system, where defendants have the right to an attorney, the right to a speedy trial, and the presumption of inno cence until guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt, immigration law does not afford detainees ample protections. For example, a noncitizen is permitted to have an attorney in immigration proceed ings, but counsel is not provided for the 80% of detainees in removal proceedings who are indigent. Furthermore, a non-citizen can be mandatorily detained for months, or even years, before being re leased or removed from the United States, and the standard for U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(VI) (making inadmissible aliens who endorse or espouse ter rorist activity or persuade others to endorse or espouse terrorist activity). [Vol. 62 removal is that of "clear and convincing evidence," a much lower standard than that of reasonable doubt. 108 These lesser protections have allowed federal officials to under take several initiatives that have targeted immigrants, primarily those from Muslim-majority countries, in the name of national secur ity. Muslims in the immigration system have been subjected to possibly abusive 109 preventive detention, 110 exclusion based on politi cal views, heightened surveillance and arguably unconstitutional racial profiling. 111 Detainees in the immigration system face serious hurdles in challenging the government's case for removal due to the lower removal standard of "clear and convincing evidence" as well as the inability to access and challenge the secret evidence presented and alleged by the government. 112 The government has, to some extent, conflated immigration and counterterrorism programs and has encouraged use of the immigra tion system as an important tool in counterterrorism efforts. 113 The result has been a system that, although legal under U.S. law, 114 (November 14, 2001 ), available at http:// www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2001/agcrisisremarks11_14.htm ("The INS will also be an important part of our effort to prevent aliens who engage in or support terrorist activity from entering our country.").
See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II) or (III
114. See DHS 2011 IG Report, supra note 107, at 1 (noting that immigration au thorities had generally complied with applicable domestic laws).
115. See Under the Radar, supra note 50, at 18 (citing the conclusion of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Migrants that U.S. immigration enforcement pol icies violate international laws that bar arbitrary detention).
VIII. ADMINISTRATIVE/EXECUTIVE MEASURES
The AUMF and Patriot Act cemented the government's authority to determine whether information was too sensitive to disclose and then punish those who disclosed such information. 116 More recently, Congress enacted the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012, which empowered the President to take extraordinary national secur ity measures unilaterally and enabled further non-disclosure of information by the administration and military. 117 One area in which the tensions between secret, unilateral execu tive action and the desire for a public, multi-branch course of action has been most prominent is that of targeted killings. The U.S. use of unmanned aerial vehicles ("drones") for targeted killings 118 of sus pected terrorists has expanded significantly since President Obama took office in 2009. 119 The Obama administration has consistently emphasized the necessity, efficacy and legality of targeted killings. However, the program has prompted much debate over its exis tence, 120 the moral calculus 121 and legal parameters and authorities for such a program, 122 and specific questions regarding the legality of its scope in terms of geographic location of the target and citizenship of the target. 123 The parameters and future of the targeted killings program should be considered in the context of two Obama adminis tration positions as to the nature of the battle being fought: first, the assertion that the theater of war for U.S. counterterrorism efforts is not restricted geographically and, therefore, encompasses the entire globe; 124 and second, statements made by administration officials in early 2013 that although the country should not remain on a war footing permanently, current counterterrorism efforts will likely last another ten to twenty years. 125 The parameters of the targeted killing program remain largely shielded from public view, with limited information disclosed during President Obama's first term 126 and the leak of a classified Depart ment of Justice memorandum detailing some of the legal bases for the program. 127 In early 2012, Attorney General Holder's public statement on drone use made clear that the administration was not bound geographically, that U.S. citizenship was no protection against being included on the list of targets for a drone strike, and that no judicial process was constitutionally necessary to target U.S. citizens so long as the administration followed its own careful procedures of determining whether to target a citizen. 128 In May 2013, President Obama gave his second 129 major na tional security policy speech, discussing a number of national security and foreign policy priorities, but focusing in large part on the parameters of the administration's targeted killing program. 130 In it, he argued that the use of drones to kill suspected terrorists is effec tive, legal and necessary, yet also acknowledged legal, foreign policy and political constraints on the program. 131 Some critics were disap pointed that the speech did not place additional meaningful limits on the president's authority to use drones, and that the president's promises of transparency and adequate oversight were unsupported by specific details or plans. 132 
IX. ROLE OF MILITARY AND EXTRA-TERRITORIAL COUNTER TERRORISM ACTIVITIES
A. Military Courts and Detention
The Bush administration decided immediately after the Septem ber 11 attacks to detain suspected terrorists as unlawful enemy combatants-often at the U.S. military facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba-and to try them, if at all, before a military commission. 133 Such detention would not necessarily comport with international standards, and any commissions would be administered by the execu tive branch and would not necessarily include the protections mandated by the Uniform Code of Military Justice for the courts mar tial system. 134 130. Remarks by the President at the National Defense University, May 23, 2013, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-presi dent-national-defense-university (hereinafter "May 2013 NDU Speech").
131. [Vol. 62
Detention at the Guant ánamo Bay Facility
In designating the Guant ánamo Bay, Cuba military facility 135 to hold detainees, the Bush Administration made an overt choice to seek to evade the domestic legal protections that would run to detainees held on U.S. soil, 136 including access to habeas corpus hearings. 137 The government further denied the applicability of international human rights and humanitarian norms and international law more generally, as applied to the detainees held at Guant ánamo. 138 When the Supreme Court held that the U.S. habeas corpus statute encom passed the indefinite detention of detainees at Guant ánamo, 139 the administration convinced Congress to amend that statute to deny all detainees the right to habeas corpus, even those who had already filed claims in court. 140 In the 2008 Boumediene v. Bush decision, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress and the President could not de cide that detainees at Guant ánamo had no access to the law. 141 Since then, most captured detainees have been taken to other locations, such as the Bagram Air Force base in Afghanistan, where courts have held that detainees have no habeas rights. 142 Since 2002, 779 men have been taken to the naval base in Guan tánamo Bay, Cuba, 143 and 155 remained there as of February 2014. 144 There have been consistent reports of widespread abuse, tor ture, and violations of the prisoners' human rights. 145 Almost twothirds of the prisoners joined a months-long hunger strike in 2013, which led to military resorting to force-feeding several prisoners. 146 Federal district courts declined to intervene on behalf of the prison ers, despite widespread condemnation by the United Nations and international human rights groups that the force-feeding constitutes torture. 147 The government changed its policy in December 2013 such that it will no longer disclose to the public whether detainees are par ticipating in hunger strikes. 148 President Obama recommitted to closing the Guant ánamo Bay in May 2013, 149 after failing to fulfill the promise to do so when he took office in 2009. 150 
Access to Justice
The United States Supreme Court, in a series of cases from 2004 to 2008, 151 found various aspects of the administration's detention and military commission model to be unconstitutional. However, the Supreme Court consistently found that the use of military commis sions instead of the ordinary criminal justice system was constitutionally acceptable. 152 Supreme Court jurisprudence set a minimum guarantee of con stitutional rights to be available to detainees, such as that of habeas corpus, but curtailing certain procedural and substantive protections in a military commission system is acceptable. 153 After initially sug [Vol. 62 gesting that military commissions were not necessary to try detainees, President Obama in 2009 revived the military commission system, 154 citing the long history of their use and military neces sity. 155 A July 2009 protocol noted that detainees are entitled to the presumption of trial in an ordinary criminal court, but numerous ob jective and subjective factors could warrant a change in venue, including strength of interest, efficiency, and "other prosecution con siderations" such as the available sentence and the ability to use certain evidence in a given forum. 156 Under the Military Commissions Act of 2009, evidence from tor ture or cruel, inhuman or degrading interrogations is disallowed, the use of hearsay is limited, defendants are granted greater latitude in selecting their counsel, and protections against self-incrimination were instituted. 157 Nonetheless, significant deviations exist among the military commissions, the courts-martial system, and ordinary criminal courts. Defendants in military commissions are guaranteed neither the right to remain silent or the right to the exclusion of their previous coerced statements, 158 nor the right to a speedy trial. 159 Trial for ex post facto crimes is permissible in a military commis sion. 160 Guilty verdicts in non-capital cases can be rendered by twothirds of the jury. 161 Hearsay evidence is more easily admissible and access to classified information is significantly curtailed. 162 The con troversial and problematic curtailing of these due process protections is further compounded by the Obama administration's reservation of the right to continue to imprison anyone acquitted under the military commission system if security interests suggest that continued deten tion is necessary. 163 A number of military commission trials have taken place at the Guant ánamo Bay detention facility, 164 despite critiques that the tri als are both unnecessary given the availability of ordinary criminal courts and the courts-martial system and fundamentally unfair, and despite irregularities and setbacks. For example, Omar Khadr was first detained in 2002 at the age of fifteen, subjected to problematic interrogation, and eventually pled guilty to various terrorism-related charges. 165 Salim Hamdan, a driver to Osama bin Laden, was con victed of conspiracy in a military commission, a charge that was overturned by an appellate court in 2012 based on the fact that con spiracy was not considered a war crime at the time that Hamdan was detained. 166 
Torture and Accountability
The United States has long been party to international treaties prohibiting torture as well as cruel, degrading, and inhuman treat ment. Among them are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 167 the Geneva Conventions, 168 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 169 the American Convention on Human Rights, 170 and the Convention Against Torture. 171 On the domestic level, the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Con [Vol. 62 stitution have been interpreted as prohibiting torture, 172 and various domestic laws codify the obligations in the Convention Against Tor ture: the federal Torture Statute, 173 the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 174 the Alien Tort Claims Act, 175 and the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998. 176 In late 2003, evidence surfaced of abuse and torture of detainees held at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, at the hands of members of the U.S. military. 177 Similar reports surfaced from the detention facility at Guant ánamo Bay. 178 Memos prepared by the Office of Legal Coun sel in 2002 and 2003 advised the President and the military that detainees who were suspected members of Al Qaeda were not pro tected by international and domestic prohibitions against torture and, furthermore, that abuse of detainees would not constitute "tor ture" unless the interrogators intended to cause the type of pain associated with death or organ failure. 179 Those memos were subse quently rescinded, and several members of the military were convicted at courts-martial for detainee abuse. 180 Congress subse quently cemented the U.S. prohibition of the abuse and torture of detainees with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. 181 In 2009, President Obama signed an executive order banning the use of enhanced interrogation techniques and limiting interrogation techniques to those permitted in the Army Field Manual. 182 Such limitations were reinforced with the Military Commissions Act of 2009. 183 Despite his campaign rhetoric on the need for a full account ing of torture, President Obama has not pursued prosecution and has precluded a full investigation of those who created the policies that arguably allowed torture to occur. 184 
Non-refoulement
The non-refoulement obligation in Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture 185 applies to U.S. extraordinary rendition practices and the movement of detainees from the Guant ánamo detention facil ity. With regard to the former, when Canadian-Syrian dual citizen Maher Arar was rendered to Syria, the U.S. was obligated to seek assurances that he would not be mistreated there. However, evidence suggests that Arar was subjected to prolonged abuse and torture by his captors in Syria. 186 With regard to Guant ánamo, several detain ees have been cleared for release, but under the obligation of non refoulement, the U.S. continues to hold them because of fear of tor ture upon return to their countries of citizenship. 187 
B. Extra-Territorial Terrorism Law Enforcement
Since the attacks of September 11, extraordinary rendition has been used to capture over 100 suspected terrorists in foreign coun tries and remove them to other nations for interrogation and control purposes. Some such detainees suffered extreme abuse and torture at the hands of their interrogators. 188 Several have brought suits in U.S. courts seeking compensation for their treatment. Despite sub stantial evidence that citizens of Canada, 189 Germany 190 and the United Kingdom, 191 among others, were rendered by the U. S. gov ernment to other nations and were subsequently abused by the [Vol. 62 security forces in the nations to which they were rendered, all such suits have been dismissed on procedural bases. 192 In 2009 the Obama administration created a task force to study the practice of extraordinary rendition with the aim of ensuring com pliance with domestic and international human rights standards and legal norms. 193 Renditions are believed to be continuing under this articulated standard. 194 
X. SECRECY AND TERRORISM
A. Secrecy Claims and Secret Evidence
The Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) is a 1980 law that established procedures for the use of classified and secret infor mation in criminal trials. 195 CIPA outlines a comprehensive set of procedures for the treatment of evidence in criminal cases that impli cate classified information or rely on evidence that is classified. For example, CIPA allows the government, under limited circumstances, to substitute unclassified summaries of classified evidence. 196 The Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush acknowledged the need to deal with classified information in a sensitive and thoughtful man ner, and expressed confidence that ordinary criminal courts would be able to manage the task successfully. 197 
B. Secrecy in the Courtroom and Anonymous Witnesses: Secret and Classified Evidence in Civil Suits
The state secrets privilege is a common law evidentiary privilege that enables the government to prevent disclosure of sensitive state secrets in the course of litigation. The claim of privilege by the gov ernment, if upheld by a court, can result in consequences ranging from the denial of a discovery request for a particular document to the outright dismissal of a suit. Although a balancing test for assess ing claims of privilege was established in the 1950s, 198 a meaningful assessment has often been precluded by the judicial tendency to up hold claims of privilege without engaging in a substantial analysis of the underlying evidence or of the government's claimed need for non disclosure. 199 In 2009, the Obama administration promised to reform the use of the state secrets privilege to allow for greater government accountability. 200 However, the administration's continued aggres sive use of the privilege, seeking and winning dismissal of suits alleging serious government abuse such as torture, 201 suggests only continuity in the use of the privilege to prevent meaningful accounta bility through civil suits.
XI. CONCLUSION: ASSESSMENT OF U.S. ANTI-TERRORISM LAWS
In the last four years, U.S. counterterrorism policy has shifted in some significant ways, such as ending the use of abusive interroga tion practices and accepting that international law applies to U.S. counterterrorism practices. However, the continuity between the Bush and Obama administrations in the substance of many counterterrorism programs, the assertion of high levels of presiden tial power and the continued high level of secrecy has created a bipartisan imprimatur of the robust counterterrorism programs that exist today, as well as the many problematic aspects of those pro grams. Congress, the judiciary and the public, all grateful that no large-scale terrorist attacks have occurred since 2001 and cognizant that threats still exist, have been largely acquiescent despite signifi cant costs to human rights and civil liberties in the form of racial and religious profiling, indefinite detention, expansive and seemingly poorly controlled surveillance, extrajudicial killings, and torture and other abuses for which there has been a pronounced lack of accountability.
The government's aggressive counterterrorism stance has influ enced actions and policies outside of the U.S. federal government: the work of domestic local and state-level law enforcement has been al tered through federal programs mandating vertical informationsharing and coordination; the U.S. has exerted significant influence on the United Nations Security Council in shaping and promoting resolutions that have had a worldwide impact on counterterrorism programs; and the U.S. has exerted its soft power to attempt to influ ence other nations to shape their own counterterrorism policies in [Vol. 62 ways that promote U.S. interests. 202 Furthermore, the U.S. stance on issues like foreign surveillance and the use of drones for targeted kill ings in areas that are not active theaters of war has set a dangerous precedent with regard to other nations attempting to develop and use the same technology. 203 It may be that the muscular stance of the U.S. on such issues will promote a similar response in other nations as their technology and power develops.
Future challenges for U.S. counterterrorism law are manifold. The driving imperative will continue to be recognizing and con fronting continuing threats posed by al-Qaeda, other foreign terrorist groups, domestic terrorism and cyberterrorism. However, the U.S. would do well to improve its transparency and accountability mecha nisms to comport with the rule of law and maintain democratic values. Such initiatives are unlikely to stem from the executive branch, which means that the judiciary, Congress, and the public must engage more fully to insist upon open debate, accountability and further oversight and constraint.
The U.S. response to terrorism has been multifaceted and expan sive, reflective of the U.S. role in global security, and is an ongoing work in progress. Branches of the federal government and the public question and redefine their obligations and roles in upholding secur ity while safeguarding the rule of law, and the debate over the appropriate course of action on these matters will no doubt continue for the foreseeable future.
